X
DK
251
S37

AAC2881

29 March 82

RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONARY PAMPHLETS

DK
251
S3

Secret diplomatic documents and treaties

From the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Former Russian Government.

Volume I

With an Introduction by Leon Trotzky,
People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

Translated from the originals, and published by the Bureau of International Revolutionary Propaganda attached to the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Workmen's and Peasants' Government of the Russian Republic.

Z 7 Mud 82

PETROGRAD,
January, 1918.

Printed by „Herold“, 7 Rota, 26.

Secret Diplomacy.

In beginning the publication of the secret diplomatic documents pertaining to the foreign policy of Czarism as well as of the bourgeois-coalition governments during the first seven months of the revolution, we are but fulfilling the obligation imposed upon us by our party when in opposition. Secret diplomacy is an indispensable tool in the hands of the mighty minority that must blindfold the majority in order to subjugate it to the interests of this minority Imperialism with its world-absorbing plans, its piratical alliances and schemes, has brought the system of secret diplomacy to a high stage of development. The struggle with imperialism which has bled and devastated the peoples of Europe is a struggle with capitalistic diplomacy, which has also reason to be afraid of daylight.

The Russian people and the peoples of all the world as well should be informed of the documentary proof of those plans which high finance and commerce with the aid of their parliamentary and diplomatic agents were forging in the dark. Their right to learn this truth has cost the peoples of Europe numberless victims and universal destruction.

The abolition of secret diplomacy is a primary condition for a really honest, popular, democratic foreign policy. The government of the Soviets has undertaken the task of realizing such a policy. Therefore we now make public those treaties and agreements which have lost all binding force for the Russian workmen, soldiers and peasants, at the same time

unreservedly offering all the belligerents an immediate truce.

The bourgeois politicians of Germany & Austro-Hungary and their press agents will probably attempt to utilise these published documents in order to demonstrate the advantageous position of the diplomacy of the Central Empires. However, any such attempt is doomed to utter failure. And this for two reasons: First, because we intend soon to bring before the bar of public opinion secret documents characterizing with sufficient clearness the diplomacy of the Central Empires. Secondly, aud this is the main point,— the methods of secret diplomacy are as international in character as is imperialistic piracy. When the German proletariat shall ever in its revolutionary march gain free access to the secret vaults of its government, it will have the pleasure of drawing therefrom documents that are by no means behind those we are now publishing. We only cherish the wish that this will take place as soon as possible.

The Workmen's & Peasants' government absolutely abolishes all secret diplomacy with its appurtenances of intrigue, cipher code and trickery. We have nothing to conceal. Our program merely formulates the wishes of millions of workmen, soldiers and peasants. We desire an immediate peace, upon the basis of the honest coexistence and cooperation of all peoples. We desire the immediate dethronement of Capital In revealing to all the world the work of the ruling classes as it is expressed in the secret documents of diplomacy, we address to the toiling masses the appeal which is the unalterable foundation of our foreign policy:

„Proletariat of all lands, unite".

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs:

L. Trotzky.

Agreement regarding Constantinople and the straits.

Political section II, Information.

February the 19th, March the 4th, 1915, the Minister of Foreign Affairs delivered to the Ambassadors of France and Great Britain a memorandum expressing the desirability of annexing to Russia as the result of the present war the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora and the Dardanelles; southern Thrace up to the line of Enos-Midia; the coast of Asia Minor between the Bosphorus, the river Sakaria and a point along the Ysmidbay, subject to later determination; the Islands Imbros and Tenedos. The special rights of France and England within the confines of said territories to remain intact. Both the French and British Governments have expressed their consent to satisfy our aspirations contingent upon the successful end of the war as well as upon the satisfaction of a whole series of requirements advanced by France and England regarding both the confines of the Ottoman Empire and those of other territories.

These requirements, so far as they concern Turkey, are as follows: The recognition of Constontinople as a free port for the transit of goods, and freedom of passage through the straits for merchant ships.

The recognition of the rights of England and France in Asiatic Turkey, to be specifically defined by special agreement between France, England and Russia.

The leaving of the sacred Mussulman places and of Arabia under independent Mussulman rule.

The inclusion in the English sphere of influence of that zone of Persia which was by agreement between England and Rnssia in the year 1907, declared neutral.

Having recognized on the whole the legitimacy of these requirements, the Russian government entered, however, some reservations:

With a view toward formulating our desires regarding the sacred Moslem places, it is deemed necessary to ascertain immediately whether said places shall remain under the rule of Turkey, leaving to the Sultan the title of Caliph, or whether the intention is to create new independent sovereignties. In our opinion, it would seem desirable to separate the Caliphat from Turkey. At all events, freedom of pilgrimage ought to be safeguarded.

Agreeing to the inclusion of the neutral zone of Persia into the English sphere of influence, the Russian government deems it, however, just to stipulate that the region of the cities Ispahau and Jesda be left to Russia, and likewise that part of the neutral zone wedged between the Russian and Afgan frontiers and reaching the very Russian boundaries near Zulfagar, — be included in the Russian sphere of influence.

The Russian Government deems it desirable at the same time to reach a settlement regarding the question of Northern Afganistan contiguous with Russia, in the sense expressed by Russia in the treaties of the year 1914.

Upon Italy's entering into the war, our aspirations have been communicated also to the Italian Government, which has on its part likewise expressed consent upon the condition of a successful end of the war, of a realization of Italy's aspirations generally, and in the East particularly, and of the recognition by us of Italy's rights in the territories surrendered by us, similar to those enjoyed by France and England.

Secret treaties.

Dividing Turkey. (From the secret Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Information regarding the question of Asia Minor.

Febr. 21, 1917.

As a result of the negotiations that took place in the spring of the year 1916 in London and Petrograd, the Allied Governments of Great Britain France and Russia have arrived at an agreement concerning the future distribution of their respective spheres of influence and territorial acquisitions in Asiatic Turkey, and likewise concerning the question of establishing within the confines of Arabia an independent Arabian state or federation of Arabian states.

This agreement in the main is as fallows.

Russia acquires the provinces: Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis as well as all the territory of Southern Kurdistan along the line Mush—Sert—Ibn—Amalie,— the Persian frontier.

It would appear that the limiting point of the Russian acquisitions along the coast of the Black Sea should be the point west of Trebizond, subject to future determination.

France obtains the coast province of Syria, the Aden—vilayet and the territory bounded on the south by the line Aintal—Mardin down to the future Russian boundaries, and the north by the line Ala—dag—Kessarea—Ak— dag — Ildiz— dag — zara — Ogain — Kharput.

Great Britain obtains the Southern part of Mesopotamia with Bagdad, and in Syria asks for the ports Karfus and Accu.

According to an agreement between France and England, the zone between the French and the English possessions forms the Confederation of the Arabian states or the Independent Arabian state and the respective spheres of influence therein are defined.

Alexandretta is declared a free port.

With a view to securing the religious interests of the Allied Powers, Palestine together with the holy places is excluded from Turkish—territory, and will be subordinated to a special régime as per agreement between Russia, France and England.

In view of the general rule, the signatory powers to this agreement bind themselves mutually to respect the concessions and privileges that had existed up to the war in the regions acquired by them.

They agree to share in the Ottoman debt proportionately to their respective acquistions.

True to the orignial. (Signature).

To the question of Constantinople & the Straits.

Fu. Arch 14. Copy 6. 403. spec.

Secret Telegram of the Minister of Foreign affairs at Paris.

March. 5, 1915. № 1226.

Feb, 26 (March, 8) the French Ambassador announced to me in the name of his Government that France is most willingly ready to see the realization of our desires with respect to the Straits & Constantinople (as outlined in my telegram to you № 937)

for which I asked you to express to Delcassé my appreciation. In his talks with you Delcassé had long before repeatedly expressed the assurance that we may count on the sympathy of France. Before, however, giving us a more definite assurance in the foregoing sense he referred to the necessity of first clarifying the attitude of England, who he feared might raise objections.

The British Government has in writing expressed its consent to Russia's annexing the Straits & Constantinople to the extent demanded by us. The only condition it stipulates is the security of its own economic interests as well as a like favorable attitude on our part toward England's political aspirations in other provinces.

I personally, reposing as I do full confidence in Delcassé, consider his assurances perfectly satisfactory. However, in order to satisfy the Imperial Government, it is desirable to obtain a more accurate statement to the effect that France agrees fully to satisfy our desires, even as the British Government has done.

(Sign.) Sasonov.

A Secret Telegram of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in London.

March, 7, 1915. № 1265.

Referring to the memorandum of the British Embassy of March 12, please express to Grey the profound appreciation by the Imperial Government of England'a full & final agreement to slove the question of the Straits & Consantinople conformably to Russia's wishes. The Imperial Government fully appreciates the sentiments of the British Government & feels assured that the unreserved recognition of their mutual interests will for ever secure the friendship between Russia & Great Britain.

Having already granted the conditions regarding commerce in the Straits & in Constantinople, the Imperial Government sees no obstacle in the way of establishing: 1) freedom of transit through Constantinople of goods coming either from or into Russia, and freedom of passage through the Straits for merchant ships.

In order to facilitate the taking of the Dardanelles by the Allies, the Imperial Government is ready to aid in the work of attracting on rational principles the help of those states whose cooperation Great Britain & France may deem useful.

The Imperial Government fully shares in the view of the British Government that the Holy Moslem places must also in the future remain under the rule of an independent Moslem power. It is, morever, desirable to make it plain at once whether the intention is to leave these places under Turkey's rule with the Turkish Sultan retaining the title of Caliph, or to create new independent states,—since only in correspondence with the one or the ather intention will the Imperial Government be able to formulate its wishes. In as far as the Imperial Government is concerned, it would regard the separation of the Caliphate from Turkey as highly desirable. Freedom of pilgrimage must, of course, be fully secured.

The Imperial Government confirms the new agreement as to the inclusion of the neutral zone of Persia in the English sphere of influence. It considers it just however to ask that the regions of the cities of Ispahau & Josdo forming as they do one integral whole, should be Russia, in view of the Russian interests created there.

The neutral zone at present cuts in wedgelike between the borders or Russia & Afganistan & reaches close to the very Russian boundary at Zulfagar. It will, therefore, be necessary to annex part of this wedge to the Russian sphere of influence.

Of quite essential importance to the Imperial Government is undoubtedy the question of railway construction within the neutral zone, which question will require some further friendly considerations.

The Imperial Government expects in general the full recognition of its right to freedom of action within its sphere of influence & it claims in particular the right to a preferential development in said sphere of its financial & economic enterprises.

Finally, the Imperial Government finds it desirable to reach simultaneously the solution of the questions regarding also northern Afganistan which is contiguons with Russia, the solution to be in the sense expressed on this subject by the Imperial Ministry in the negotiations of the past year.

(Sign.) Sasonov.

The Agreement with Italy in the year 1915.

A bargain and its outbidding.

Very serious.

The question of getting Italy away from the then Tripple Alliance and of attracting her on the side of the coalition (of the Allied Powers) had arisen at the verybeginning of the war. The attempt failed.

The mission of Prince Bülow, in Ròme, resulted in that the change of Italian policy was postponed a whole half year.

Germany's representative endeavored to buy Italy's neutrality with the price of concessions at the expence of Austria. The Danube Monarchy followed this road unwillingly. In the latter half of Febr., 1915, in view of this fruitless bargaining the prospect of

Italy's joining the Allies again appeared possible. The Russian Government did not at that time regard Italy's entering the war as essentially necessary to the cause of the Allies.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed the fear that the appearance as member in the Alliance of a fourth European power might complicate the mutual relations of the Allies.

Tbougb not opposing the plan of recieving Italy into the Alliance, S. D. Sasonov believed that at all events the initiative in this move ought to be left to Italy. The negotiations were formally started in London at the end of February, old style, upon the initiative of the Italian Ambassador, the Marquis Imperiali. They were carried on between Sir E, Grey and the respective Ambassadors of France: M. Paul Cambon, Russia: Count Benkendorf, and Italy: the above named Marquis.

Their course was complicated on the one hand by the continued efforts of Prince Bülow to prevail upon the Vienna Cabinet to grant concessions in favor of Italy, and on the other, by the incompatibility of those interests which the Representatives of the great powers in London had to defend.

Both France and Russia thought. Italy's demands extravagant: the former mainly because of the south eastern coast of the Adriatic; the latter, because of the north eastern coast.

Six weeks were consumed in the solution of details as to the future territorial distribution of the Albanian and Dalmatian zones.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs firmly defended the interests of the South Slavs, and insisted upon securing to Serbia an outlet to the sea; thus step by step barring Italy's aspirations concerning both the increase of her coast line and the neutralization of the regions adjudged to the Serbs. In the meantime the military events on the various

fronts suggested to the military leaders the necessity of Italy's immediate joining the Allies. In the early days of April the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reluctant to meet the demands of the Allies to sign a treaty with Italy, advanced new demands, viz: the necessity to stipulate a possibly temporary active participation by the Kingdom. Furthermore, Russia demanded: 1) the fixing of the time for making the treaty public and 2) the recognition as inviolable of the agreements previously entered into by the members of the three Great Powers.

On April the 13—16th the treaty was signed by Grey, Cambon, Prince Benkenborf and Marquis Imperiali. During the days preceding this signing some more concessions in favor of Serbia and Montenegro were won from Italy.

Enclosed herewith is the text of the treaty with Italy.

Secret Treaties.

The secret agreement of England, France & Russia with Italy to allow the latter to seize with their aid the regions of Serbo-Croatia, Trieste aud South Tyrol, Albania, the Greek Islands, some parts of Asia Minor and Africa, provided she enters her armed forces against Austro-Germany, and prevents the intervention of the Pope in the interests of cessation of the war.

The Italian ambassador in London, Marquis Imperiali, following the instructions of his Government, has the honour of communicating to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sir E. Grey, to the French ambassador (in London) Mr. Cambon, aud to the Russian Ambassador (in London) Count Benckendorf the following Memorandum:

Art. 1. A military convention shall at once be entered into between the general staffs of France,

Great-Britain, Russia & Italy. This convention is to determine the minimum of military forces which Russia will have to mobilize against Austro-Hungary in case the latter should desire to thrust all her forces against Italy, & Russia were to direct her main attack against Germany. Said military convention will likewise regulate the questions regarding truce, inasmuch as such questions in their essential nature enter into the sphere of the Supreme command of the armies.

Art. 2. Italy on her side binds herself to use all the means at her command in order jointly with France, Great-Britain aud Russia, to wage war upon all the states that fight them.

Art. 3. The naval forces of both France & Great-Britain will lend Italy unfaltering, active cooperation until either the Austrian fleet is destrayed or peace is attained. Between France, Great-Britain aud Italy there shall in the meantime be instituted a military-naval Convention.

Art. 4. Agreeably to the present treaty Italy is to obtain: the region of the Trentino, all southern Tyrol up to its natural geographical boundary line, which is Brenner; the city & district Triest; the county Goritza & Gradistche; all Istria up to Quarnero, including Valosski & the Istrian islands Kherso & Lussina as well as the smaller islands Blavnika, Unia, Kanidoli, Palazzoulo, the islands of St. Peter Nemvius, Azinello & Gruzza with all the adjacent islets.

Note 1. In fulfillment of the foregoing in Art. 4, the boundary will be traced along the following points: beginning at the summit Umbrile & northward to Stilvio & further down the summit—level of the Reition Alps, it will pass close to the riverhead Adigio aud river Aisack; thereafter it will cross the mountains Reshen, Brenner & the heights Ats & Cilber; thereafter the boundary line shall turn southward, cross the mountains Toblach & reach the present boundary Kraina which runs thru the Alps, following which it

reaches mount Tarvis, whence it will pass on thru the waterbasin of the Julian Alps, thru the Predel elevation, Mount Mangart, the mountains Tricorno aud the summits Podberdo, Padlaneskan aud Idrio. Hence the boundary will pass south—eastward to Shneberg so that the basin of river Sasfa & its tributaries do not enter as part of the Italian territory. From Shneberg the boundary line drops down to the coast, embracing Castua, Motuli & Vlosski as part aud parcel of the Italian possessions.

Art. 5. In like manner Italy shall obtain the province of Dalmatia in its present form, including within its confines, on the north, Lissarika & Trebinia, while on the south, all the possessions down to the line that passes near cape Plank eastward along the summit level, in such a manner that the Italian possessions include all the valleys stretching along the rivers that flow into Cebenico, viz: Chicolo, Kerka and Butisnitza with all their tributaries. Furthermore, Italy shall have all the islands north & west of the Dalmatian coast, beginning with the islands Premuda Celva, Ulbo, Skerda, Maon, Pago & Pundadura, thence further north & up to Meleda on the south, joining thereto the islands St. Andrea, Buzia, Lissa, Lessina, Terkila, Kupzola, Katz & Lagosta with all their adjacent cliffs & islets as well as Pelagosa barring, however, the islands Great & Small Cirona, Buia, Solta & Brozza.

Subject to neutralisation are: 1) All the coast line from cape Frank, on the north, down to the southern end of the peninsula Sabuncello, on the south, including in the neutralized region the entire said peninsula; 2) part of the coast beginning at the spot situated 10 versts to the south of cape „Old Ragusa“, and further south close to the rivulet Voyussa, so that the confines of the neutalized zone willl embrace all Kataro bay with its ports Antivari, Dulcino, San Glovanni di Medua and Durazzo; whereby the rights

of Montenegro, following from the declaration exchanged by the contracting parties in April and May 1909, shall remain inviolable. However, in view of the fact that said rights have been recognized only in respect of the present possessions of Montenegro, they must not subsequently be extended to those lands or ports which might in future be allotted to Montenegro. Thus, no part of the coast now belonging to Montenegro is subject to future neutralisation. Those limitations of right will remain in force which refer to the port Antivari and to which Montengro herself consentedi In 1909; 3) finally, the islands that will not pass to Italy.

Note 2. The following lands along the Adriatic will be included by the Powers of the Quadruple Entente within Croatia, Serbia & Montenegro: North of the Adriatic,-all the coasts beginning with the bay Volossok on the border of Istria & up to the northern boundary of Dalmatia inclusive of the entire coast now belonging to Hungary as well as of the whole coast of Croatia, of the port Fium aud of the smaller ports Nov & Carlopi, likewise of the islands Veli, Perviccio, Gregrio, Koli & Arbe; south of the Adriatic wherein Serbia & Montenegro are interested,—all the coast fron cape Plank to the river Drina with the most important harbors Spalato, Ragusa, Vattro, Antivari, Dulcinio & San Giovani di Mədua also the islands Great Ciroda, Small Cirona, Bua, Solt, Brozza, Jaklin aud Kalamata.

The port Durazzo could be ceded to an independent Mohamedan state of Albania.

Art. 6, Italy shall obtain in full possession Vallona, the islands Sasseni and a territory sufficiently large to render them secure in military respects,—viz: somewhat between the river Vojussa on the north & east, down to the borders of the district Shikarski on the south.

Art. 7. Italy having obtained Trentino aud Istria

agreeably to art. 4. Dalmatia and the Adriatic islands agreeably to art. 5. also the bay of Vallona,—ought not, in case a small autonomous neutralized state be formed in Albania, to resist the possible aspirations of France, Great Britain & Russia regarding the distribution among Montenegro, Serbia & Greece of the northern & southern borders of Albania. The southern coast of the latter, from the boundary of the Italian region Vallona aud up to the cape Stilas, is subject to neutralization.

To Italy will be left the right to carry on the external relations of „Albania". Italy must at all avents agree to leave to Albania a territony sufficiently large so that the boundary of the latter remain, west of Okrida, contiguous with the boundary of Greece & Serbia.

Art. 9. France, Great-Britain & Russia acknowledge in principle the fact that it is to the interest of Italy to maintain the political equilibrium in the Mediterranean, and likewise her rights to receive, after Turkey has been divided, an equal share with them in the basin of the Mediterranean, viz: in that part thereof which adjoins the province Adalia where Italy has already acquired rights & attained interests foreshadowed in the British-Italian convention. The zone to be surrendered into Italy's possession will in due time be circumscribed in accordance with the vital interests of France & Great-Britain. In like manner, Italy's interests will deserve attention also in case the territorial inviolability of Asiatic Turkey is maintained by the Powers during some period of time, and if it were merely necessary to stake among themselves the respective spheres of influence. If in the course of the present war France, Great-Britain & Russia succeeded in occupying some regions of Asiatic Turkey, the province contiguous with Adalia further below more definitely circumscribed, must be left to Italy who reserves the right to occupy it.

Art. 10. In Lybia Italy obtains all those rights & privileges which heretofore have been appropriated by the Sultan on the ground of the Treaty of Lausaune.

Art. 11. Italy shall receive a share in the indemnity commensurate with the extent of the sacrifices aud efforts contributed by her.

Art. 12. Italy joins in the declaration made by France, England & Russia regarding Arabia aud the Holy Moslem places, that each and all remain under the administration of an independent Mussulman Power.

Art. 13. Should the French & English colonial possessions in Africa be extended at the expense of Germany, then both France and Great-Britain recognise in principle Italy's right to demand for herself certain compensations in the sense of widening her possessions in Eritrea, Somaliland, in Lybia & in the colonial regions contiguous with colonies of France & England.

Art. 14. England binds herself to facilitate for Italy the realisation upon the London market, on favorable terms, of a loan not less than 50 million pounds.

Art. 15. Representatives of France, England and Russia declare themselves bound to support Italy's efforts to prevent the Holy See from participating in any diplomatic moves whatsoever on the subject of either peace negotiations or regardnig questions of regulation in connection with the present war.

Art. 16. The present Treaty must be kept secret. As regards Italy's joining in the declaration of Sept. 5th., 1914, it alone will be made public soon after Italy has declared war or war has been declared upon her.

Having duly considered the present Memorandum, the Representatives of France, Great-Britain & Russia, all being duly authorized, have agreed with the

Representative of Italy, likewise duly authorized by his Government, upon the following subject, that: France, Great-Britain aud Russia express their full agreement with this Memorandum presented to them by the Italian Government. With regard to articles 1, 2 and 3 of this Memorandum, treating of the coordination of the military and naval operations of all the four Powers, Italy declares that she will actively enter the field in the nearest possible future, at any rate not later than one month after the signing of the present document by the contracting parties.

The underwriters have in London put their hand to and have with their respective seals confirmed the Present in four copies, the 26th day of April, 1915. (Sir Edward Grey. — Cambon. - Marquis Imperiali. — Count Benkendorf).

The Annexation Appetite of the French Bourgeoisie.

A secret telegram to the Ambassador in Paris.
Petrograd, Jan. 30, 1917, № 507.

A Copy to London.

Secret.—At a Supreme Audience M. Dumergue, communicated to the Emperor the aspirations of France as follows: After the war is over France would like to secure the return of Alsace Lorraine as well as a special position in the valley of the river Saar; she would further like to effect a political segregation of Germany's transrhenish dominions and to establish them on a special status so that the river Rhine might in the future serve as a formidable strategic protection against all German intrusion. Dumergue expressed the hope that the Emperor's Go-

vernment will not hesitate at once to formulate its consent to these desires. It pleased his Imperial Majesty to accept in principle these propositions. I therefore requested Dumergue to communicate to me, after corresponding with his Government, the agreement which could then be shaped after the form of an exchange of notes between the French Ambassador & myself. Meeting thus the desires of our Ally I deem it, however, incumbent upon me to put on record the viewpoint expressed by the Imperial Government in a telegram of Febr. 24, 1916, sub № 948, viz:— Leaving to France & England full liberty in defining the western boundaries of Germany, we hope on our part that the Allies will leave to us a like liberty in marking our boundary lines with Germany & Austro-Hungary.

Therefore, the said exchange of notes regarding the question raised by Dumergue furnishes us the grounds upon which to ask the French Government at the same time to confirm its consent as to Russia's freehand in establishing her western borders. We shall in due time forward the Paris Cabinet exact data respecting this question.

We furthermore deem it necessary to ask consent of France to abolish after the war the foreigner's status attaching to the Aland Island. Please reach a conclusion in the foregoing sense with Briand & telegraph the outcome. (Sign.) Pokrovsky.

The role of Japan.

A secret telegram to the ambassadors in London, Paris and Tokyo. April 28th — May 11th, 1916, № 1956 (by cipher).

Personal. Highly confidential. The Japanese Government has informed me that the German Consul in Stockholm twice approached the Japanese Consul, in the endeavor to convince him that it is desirable to conclude peace between Germany, Russia and Japan. 1 told Motono that 1 should be ready, to hear the German peace proposals provided that such be simultaneously made Russia, France, England and Japan. As to Italy, so long as she is not at war with Germany, there is no need of asking Germany to approach her; however we shall inform her of such proposals since the attitude of the Allies to them can be shapad only in common by all of them.

(An addition for Tokyo). Kindly express thanks to the Japanese Government, for the valuable communication.

(Signature) Sazonov.

How Allies are recruited.
An enquiry regarding the Greek question.

Nr. I. Offering southern Albania to Greece.

November 22, 1914, the Consuls of Russia, England! and France in Athens announced to the Greek Government the offer to Greece of the southern part of Albania, excepting Valona, in case she immediately joins to help Serbia. For such immediate aid Venizelos demanded a „secure warranty of Rumania" against an attack upon Greece by the Bulgars. This guarantee was not given by Rumania, therefore Greece refused aid to Serbia, the offer having thus lost its force.

Nr. 2. Offering to Greece some teritories in Asia Minor.

November 12, 1915, The English Consul in Athens following instructions from his Government, declared to Venizelos that if Greece in response to a new

onslaught by Germany upon Serbia, would step forth to help the latter, the Entente Governments would recognize as belonging to Greece some important acquisitions along the coast of Asia Minor.

On January the 20th, Venizelos in a conversation with the English Consul defined more precisely the Greek aspirations in Asia Minor.

The negotiations thus begun were checked by the other negotiations regarding Bulgaria's joining the ranks of the Entente Allies (one of Greece's conditions) and were ultimately interrupted by the, dismissal of Venizelos Febr. 21, 1915. On the 9th of March 1915, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece Zogrophos, transmitted to the Consuls in Athens a note in which the Cabinet of Gunaris expressed the desire of renewing the negotiations interrupted by Venizelos' departure.

March the 30th, the Entente Consuls in reply thereto opened the negotiations with the declaration that the Governments of Russia, England and France were ready to secure to Greece, in case she came forth against Turkey, the acquisitons in the Aidin Vilait, adding however orally that this offer would be void if Greece would not immediately consent to act.

In reply the Gunaris cabinet, April 1, 1915, declared itself ready to act as soon as the Entente Powers were prepared together with the Greek armies to begin military operations against Turkey. Military action was made dependent upon the formal guaranty of the territorial integrity of Greece, including northern Epirus and the Islands, during the course of the war and for some period thereafter. The territorial acquisitions of Greece in Asia Minor as well as in other places were to be the subject of subsequent consideration.

These negotiations were not renewed for a month. On May, 1, the Greek Foreign Minister announced

that since the Entente powers apparently did not intend to quarantee the territorial integrity of Greece, the cabinet of Gunaris had decided to observe in the future full neutrality.

Nr. 3. The question of ceding Kavalla to Greece.

On January, 20th 1915, Venizelos authorized the English Consul in Athens to inform Grey that by the consent of the King, he agreed to deliver Kavalla to the Bulgars on condition that Bulgaria would join the Triple Entente.

After the dismissal of Venizelos the view of the Greek Government with respect to the Kavalla concession was altered and in the note of May, the 18th, 1915, Greece protested against all mention in the declaration made to Radoslavov May 16, by the three Consuls of the Entente in Sophia, of the readiness of their Governments to use all efforts to secure to Bulgaria the Kavalla concession. This protest remained unanswered.

On July 21, 1915, the Consuls of Russia, England and Italy communicated to the Greek foreign minister part of the declaration made contemporaneously by the British Consul in Sophia to the Bulgarian Government, which declaration referred to the concession of Kavalla and its hinterland to the Bulgars, whereby the extent of the hinterland was made dependent upon the size of the Greek acquistions in Asia Minor.

On July 30th, the Greek Government entered a new protest against the delivery of Kavalla to Bulgaria.

Nr. 4. The question of ceding the Doirana district to Greece by Serbia.

In a conversation with the Serbian Consul at Athens Sept. 8, 1915, Venizelos demanded that, in case of Greece's helping Serbia, the latter cede to

Greece the district Doiran—Gievgueli, and refrain from any pretentions to Strumnitza after the Allies' success against the Bulgars.

Sept. 11, 1915, the Serbian Government agreed, in case of a successful end of the war, to the Doirana concession as well as to the foregoing obligation respecting Strumnitza.

After the dissmissal of Venizelos, Greece still being neutral, in Oct. 1915, the question was raised as to the occupation by the Greek armies of the Doirana district after it had been evacuated by the Serbs.

This occupation was not carried out, Greece being reluctant to interfere in the Bulgaro-Serbian military operations; and, on the 11th of Oct. 1915 the Greek King announced that the rumors of Greece's intention to occupy Monastir, Gievgueli and Doiran or, in general, any part whatsoever ot Serbian territory, were unfounded, and that Greece still considered herself the Ally of Serbia.

Nr. 5. The offer of the Island Cyprus to Greece.

Oct. 7th. 1915, the British consul in Athens expressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs England's readiness to concede to Greece, the Island Cyprus if she consented at once to mobilize her entire Army to the aid of Serbia.

Oct. 12, 1915, the English Government declared that it considered this offer void inasmuch as Greece was reluctant to help Serbia.

Nr. 6. The obligations of the Entente Powers regarding Saloniki.

On the 10th of November, 1915, the consuls of the Entente Powers issued a note with regard to the occupation of Saloniki & its environs by the Allied armies. In this note the powers declared themselves

under obligation to return all the occupied territories, as well as to pay for all the losses caused by the accupation.

This declaration was taken notice of by the Greek Government in its reply of Nov. the 11th, 1915.

Nr. 7. The Position of Northern Epirus.

The evergrowing anarchy in Epirus had in the beginning of Oct. 1914, caused Venizelos to request the assistance of the London Cabinet in the negotiations between Greece & Rome regarding the establishment in Northern Epirus, without however predetermining the further destiny of this region, of a police surveillance by the Greek armies, leaving to Italy the establishment of a similar surveillance in the region of Vallona. The Italian Government expressed its consent. On Oct. 14, the Greek armies began to occupy Santi-Karanty, Premato & Argirocastro.

Febr. 14, 1915, three consuls of the Entente Powers issued warning against further seizures in Albania. Whereupon Venizelos assured them that he had no intention whatsoever of any occupation in Albania.

In May, 1915, the occupation by the Greek armies, of 18 Villages to the north-west of Koritzi took place.

The appearance in Febr. 1916, in Berat, of Albanian bands called forth the protest of Febr. 26, 1916, from four Consuls of the Entante Powers in Athens, directed against both the formation of such bands in the zone under Greek military control & their recruiting from among the local Greeks. In its reply the Greek Government declared that in the occupied region no such bands had ever been organized, and that among the bands operating in Berat & consisting of 1600 Neridites there is not a single Greek.

On March. 7, 1916, the President of the Greek council of Ministers Scouloudis, replying to the interpellation of the deputy Spironilie regarding northern Epirus, expressed the assurauce that "northern Epirus in the present delimitations of its boundaries would form henceforth an inseparable part of the Greek Kingdom". Indeed, even before Febr. 1916, the Greek Government appointed in Epirus, two prefects respectively for Argiracastro and Koritza, to replace the military forces of occupation; and upon the opening of the Greek Parliament, Jan. 11, 1916, to its session were admitted deputies from Epirus. Against these acts of the Greek Government, whose object was the annexation of northern Epirus to Greece, the four Consuls of the Entente Powers transmitted March. 13, 1916, to the Greek Government a note of protest, pointing out the discrepancy between these acts on the one hand, and the solemn declarations contained in the Greek note of Octiber 30—13, 1914, on the other.

In its reply of March 16, 1916, the Hellenic Government declared that it by no means disregarded the promises of the year 1914; it merely deemed it necessary to replace in Epirus the military rule which was incompatible with the liberal spirit of the Greeks, by a civil rule which harmonized with the general laws of the Kingdom. On the very same day the four Consuls handed over to the Greek Government another note demanding an explanation as to how the admission of deputies from Northern Epirus could be made to accord with the declarations made concerning this subject by both Gunaris & Venizelos August 1915. The reply by the Scouloudis cabinet, of March 18, 1916, pointed out that inasmuch as the budget required to cover the expenses of the administration of Epirus was supplied by its population, the latter was entitled to the right of representation by its own deputies.

Who Robs Whom.

The circumstances surrounding Rumania's entering the war and the later considerations concerning the Rumanian question.

From the very beginning of the European war Rumania officially occupied a position of neutrality often enough vaccillating one way or the other according to the fortunes of the military operations. A twofold motive lay at the bottom of it: the desire to be in time when the hour of the division of Austria struck, and the impulse to gain as much as possible at the cost of the belligerents.

Our successes in Galicia and Bukovina during 1914 and at the beginning of 1915 (the taking of Lemberg, of Premysl) as well as the appearance of our vanguards on the other side of the Karpathians, forced to the fore the question of Rumania's participation. The negotiations then begun were rather dragging in consequence of the fact that our military authorities insisted upon establishing a strategic boundary line in Bukovina so that this region remain in its entirety in the possession of Russia.

Toward the end of May of the same year our retreat began from Galicia and Poland with the simultaneous clearing of Bukovina. The mood of the leading Rumanian circles had correspondingly changed and the negotiations ended automatically, as it were.

At the end of 1915 and the beginning of 1916, after Serbia had been routed and Bulgaria had entered the war, Rumania's policy very sensibly leaned in the direction of our foes.

At this period the Rumanian Government concluded a whole series of profitable trade treaties with both Austria and Germany respecting the sale of breadstuffs as well as the supply of other vital pro-

ducts, in exchange for which it received gold and necessary manufactured goods.

This circumstance caused our military, financial and commercial authorities to assume a cautious attitude upon the question of exporting into Rumania from Russia objects of military use or products of consumption which might fall into the hands of our enemies. Practically all export was thus placed under embargo.

The splendid achievements of general Brussilov in the spring and summer of 1916 again swayed the Rumanian neutrality toward the side of the Entente Powers, thus offering the possibility of renewing the interrupted negotiations, concerning her participation.

It must be noted that from the very beginning the head of the staff of the Chief-in-command thought on military grounds Rumania's remaining neutral of greater advantage to us than her active entering into the war.

Later however general Alexieev shared in the view of the Allies who regarded the participation of Rumania as a final blow to Austria and as the beginning of the end of the war.

In Aug, 1916, there was concluded with Rumania a politico-military agreement ceding to her such land acquisitions (Bukovina, Banat, Transylvania) which obviously were out of proportion with the military activities Rumania was expected to display, since she had bound herself to declare war only upon Anstro-Hungary and was preparing to confine her operations to Transylvania only . . .

Later events have shown how much mistaken our Allies were in overestimating Rumania's participation.

At present the developments of military activities on the Rumanian front have altogether moved to the background all political questions.

Most interesting of these now is the one concerning the evacuation of Moldavia in case such action

should be required by the military situation. In anticipation fo such a contingency a special commission was formed under the presidency of Senator Zassiadko; but after the dismissal of this commission the whole work of the evacuation was entrusted to the specially authorized Sterligov. It was planned accordingly to move the Government, the parliament, the official Institutes into the City of Kherson, leaving to the Rumanian Government extraterritorial rights after the fashion of Belgium.

The gold fund has already been brought to Moscow. As to the removal of the wounded, fugitives, factories etc., the commission is now negotiating with the respective authorities.

Under the influence of the accomplished catastrophe there have come to the surface within Rumania currents displaying a negative attitude toward the further continuation of the war and seeking the immediate conclusion of peace, be it a separate peace.

However, the determination both of the King and of his Government to carry on the trial to the very end seems unshakable. The changes that have recently taken place in the complexion of Bratiano's cabinet in the sense of an agreement between the liberal and the conservative parties, lend the entire Government a more national character, thus steadying its shaky position.

The misfortunes which have befallen Rumania are the natural result of both her complete military unpreparedness and of Bratiano's twofaced policy.

The light victories of 1913 as well as the diplomatic success gained by Rumania after the Balkan war, have in great measure contributed to the self-glorification both of the public and of the Government. Indeed, politically as well as militarily the Rumanians have by far overestimated their strength,

and in consequence suffer now a bitter disappointment.

From the standpoint of Russian interests, and remembering the present state of affairs in Rumania, we must guide ourselves by the following considerations:

If circumstances took such a turn that the politico-military agreement with Rumania of 1916 were completely realized, there would be created in the Balkans a very strong state consisting of Maldavia, Valachia, Dobruja (of the present Rumania) Transylvania, Banat and Bukovina (all—acquisitions by the agreement of 1916) with a popnlation of some 13 million. This State would hardly prove friendly disposed toward Russia and would hardly refrain from trying to realize its national tendencies in Bessarabia. In like manner it would within the Balkans strive to oppose Russia's interests and by reason of the fact that its population is predominantly latin in character, it would naturally fall under the strong political influence of Italy and France. It is obvious therefore, that the break-down of Rumanias plans to rise to an all-powerful state of the above extent, is by no means contrary to Russia's interests. We must utilize this situation and strengthen for as long a time as possible those compulsory ties that at present bind Russia and Rumania together. However, if the creation of powerful states in the Balkans is to our disadvantage, the complete destruction or weakening of the existing political organisms is likewise disadvantageous to ns.

Thus, it must at present be one of our main politico-military tasks to protect Rumania against total decomposition. Our successes on the Rumanian front have for us an uncommonly high significance offering us the sole possibility of its kind to solve

once for all, and in a sense favorable to us, the question of Constantinople and the Straits. The events now unfolding in Rumania have radically changed the conditions of the agreement of 1916. Instead of the relatively moderate military support which Russia had bound herself to offer in Dobruja, she was compelled to throw upon the shoulders of the Russian armies almost the entire defence of the Rumanian territory. This military help by Russia has now assumed such dimensions that the land compensation provided for in the above mentioned agreement, to Rumania for her participation in the war, must doubtless undergo revision. The present juncture may not be opportune to raise this question, yet it were not amiss to make it in the nearest convenient future the order of the day.

The Sincerity of English Friendship.

Secret Telegram of the Plenipotentiary in London.
July 1—14. 1917. № 547.

Personal. Your attention must have been attracted by the salient discrepancy obtaining on the one hand between Lloyd George's telegram to Prince Lvov, expressing lively and fervent sympathy with Russia as well as admiration of her heroic deed, and on the other, between the attitude toward us of the British Government as outlined in my telegram of yesterday sub. № 540.

Lloyd George declared yesterday in the Parliament that the regeneration of Russia's fighting force is the great event on which perchance depend the destinies of mankind. But along with all this we are refused most needed help. The impression is inevitable that within the very midst of the British Government the right hand knows not what the left hand is

about. In part this is really the case. However sane and powerful English statesmanship, the three years of persistent war straining all the vital forces almost to the extreme, could not fail in a measure to endanger this powerful organism. Lloyd Georges this sworn enemy of the Tories and not so long ago most despised by them, has been proclaimed by the whole nation leader whose immediate co-workers are such brilliant and also such narrowminded conservatives as Curzon, Milner and Carson, and in a sense Balfour. From this combination dissension follows.

When I declare in public speeches that the old methods of diplomacy are gone forever and that no diplomacy can ever succeed without the support and the sympathy of the live social forces of which diplomacy must needs take account, such declarations are applauded by public opinion and by progressive statesmen such as Lloyd George, Lord R. Cecil and others. But to men of the type of Curzon and Milner such views are not acceptable. Lloyd George is overburdened with heavy problems of high national significance, such as the Irish question, the political struggle. It is therefore possible that while sending greetings to Russia he conscientiously, as it were, fails to take account of the fact that the activities of his colleagues at the same time undermine Russia's faith in the sincerity of English friendship.

I am aware that both Lloyd George and Balfour repose personal confidence in me. Only yesterday Lloyd George casually spoke to me in terms of genuine pleasure and admiration about Russia and asked of me detailed information regarding our situation. But aside from personal sympathies, the attitude towards what I say is now doubtless influenced by the fact that in the eyes of this Government I am a Representative who may any day have to give up his work.

Aided by your support and encouragement I might

with greater authority and perforce with more success exert an influence upon Lloyd George himself as well as on his ministers, thus dispelling the discrepancies noted above. The present moment is critical and every day counts. Having at heart none but Russia's welfare, I venture to ask you to solve one way or the other the indefinite position in which I am placed by reason of the uncertanity as to whether a new ambassador has been appointed and as to when he will arrive. I am devoting all my mental and spiritual efforts to the work both of defending Russia's interests in England and of keeping Russia's banner at its appropriate height in these times of serious disturbances. But, again, in order to continue this work I need your support without which my efforts will prove insufficient. (Sign.) Nabokov.

In the position of Lackeys.

A secret telegram to the Russian Representatives in London, Paris, Rome, Washington (by Sh. Dolt).

Personal. The last events at the front have put our foreign representatives in a morally perplexing position, the more so since throughout this perturbing time I was unable to keep them informed as to the ever changing situation. These events appeared unexpected to our Allies and produced upon them a depressing impression; we naturally could not help taking account of all this, and all our efforts were directed toward saving the national policy concerning the army, the war and the international position of Russia. This is the ground now firmly taken by the newly formed Gevernment and I count upon all our patriotism to aid the Gevernment in overcoming the disappointment that has taken hold of our Allies and in convincing them that notwithstanding

the trying situation, Russia will carry on to the very end the commen fight with the enemy.

Observing that degree of reservedness required by our position, I request your attention to the obvious importance of an exhaustive exchange of opinions by the Allies at this time. It would be necessary to consider at the conference the general situation to discover methods of mutual support in the further conduct of the war, particularly as to the approaching winter campaign.

A secret Telegram to the Representatives in London, Paris, Washington Tokyo and Stockholm.

Petrograd, July 13—26, 1917, № 3159.

The military situation consequent upon the unsteadiness of our armies and their continuous retreat, still remains very serious. The events at the front, in connection with the recent insurrection in Petrograd, mark a crisis in the public sentiment. The indignation called forth by the activities of the Bolsheviki and by German espionage is ever growing, manifesting itself at times in very acute forms. This turn is most noticeable in the Petrograd garrison and likewise among the workmen, where a sort of massawakening is taking place.

In the Sovrabdep there are signs of a ripening intention once for all to separate themselves from the Bolsheviki and even to exclude them from the Sovrabdep. In general, it is believed by persons in authority, that the Sovrabdep has never shown such faith in the Government as it does now. Owing to its latest decision the Socialist ministers are exempt from the obligation beforehand to conform their acts with the desires of the Soviet. In fulfilling its program the Government has entered upon the road of establishing the strong-hand-rule. At the fronts a whole series of extremely severe measures has been undertaken. In the very first days of the uprising the commanding officers were given the right to use arms against the insubordinate. Capital punishment was yesterday restored to punish treason as well as military crimes on the front; all the commanding officers and the Governmental commissaries at the front have by telegrams demanded this restoration. Furthermore, the Minister of the Interior in agreement with the Minister of War is empowered to stop all newspapers that invite insubordination to the military authorities.

In Petrograd measures are taken to restore complete order, to disarm the populace, prohibit meetings, parades, demonstrations. The disbanding of the culpable army divisions and their dismissal is carried out successfully. A special industrial Council is elaborating a series of practical measures of an economic nature. Concerning Finland, the Government is awaiting the moment when the position has cleared up as the Finns themselves are as yet undecided in their relations with the Governement regarding the law adopted by the Diet, of the independence of the Finnish Legislature. The news from Ukraina assert that a Secretariat has been elected, so that a delegation is expected to present its mandate to the Government for confirmation. (Sign.) Terestchenko.

The Allied Conference.

Analysed July 27, 1917.

I.

A secret Telegram of the Plenipotentiary in London. July 25 (Aug. 7), 1917. № 620.

Today was opened the Conference of the Allies wherein participated: Ribot, Painlevé, Thomas, general Foch and others; Sonnino, the Italian Ambassador and representatives of the army; from

England, all the members of the military Cabinet, Balfour, generals Robertson and Morrice. I was invited at the last minute, so that I went to the Conference without instructions and without knowing what it was about. Besides. I was the only one to represent Russia. Lloyd George opened the session with the proposition of sending to Russia a note categorically pointing out the danger to all the Allies from the chronic unsteadiness of power in Russia as well as from the absence of all discipline in her army. Thomas objected in most emphatic terms reminding him that a note of this nature might produce a rather negative impression. Sonnino in a somewhat milder form pointed out that the carrying out of Lloyd George's idea was now not expedient. Thereupon Lloyd George addressed himself to me. I said literally (inasmuch as memory is reliable) the following: „I take it for granted that your purpose is to offer Russia help and support in her trying moments. I beg of you to take it for granted that the Conference will hear through me the voice of Russia.

I confess to feeling insulted when I heard from the lips of the English premier the word "protest", and feel sure that this word has insulted Russia as well. The Head of the Russian Government spares no efforts in both putting an end to anarchy in Russia and in restoring the fighting force and discipline in the Army. At a moment like this it befits you to utter words of approval and not of criticism. It was not at all easy for Kerensky to dismiss Brussilov who has gained European renown, but he did it none the less because decisive measures were necessary. I request the Conference to believe that the genuine voice of Russia, the voice of a great country temporarily deadened, will resound and henceforth reverberate everincreasingly. Russia recognizes with evergrowing clearness that her burning problem is the safe guarding of freedom and honor; this task

she will accomplish whatever obstacles she might have to surmount.

My words had manifestly produced the necessary effect and after a short exchange of views it was decided to send Russia greetings the wording of which was intrusted to Thomas. The rest of the session was devoted to the question of transferring the English Division from Saloniki; the discussions were renewed during the second session.—To be continued.

(Sign.) Nabokov.

II.

Analysed July 28, 1917.

Secret Telegram of the Plenipotentiary in London, July 25 (Aug. 7). 1917. № 52. The continuation of my telegram sub № 520.

Having resumed the discussions respecting, the transference of the English division from Saloniki the English ministers pointed out that owing to the absence of Russian help the army of general Maude was facing serious danger: moreover, England was by no means in a position to leave at the Saloniki front a division that was extraordinarily necessary in Palestine to divert the enemy. Ribot very energetically objected and the discussion at times assumed an exceedingly acute character. As a result of these discussions the following resolutions were adopted:) 1) the English division is to be transferred from Saloniki fo Palestine, 2) two French divisions are to be mobilized from the front in reserve for the emergency of fighting operations either on the Saloniki or on some other front, 3) these measures are being adopted exclusively in the interests of military operations.

The English Government recognizes the necessity of keeping at the Saloniki front a sufficient contin-

gent of armies, binding itself not to remove any more men except in circumstances unforeseen, or in case of inevitable necessity. In such events it must duly forewarn, and agree beforehand with, the Allies who retain considerable forces at this front. France, too, may excercise the right of removing some armies from Saloniki on extraordinary occasions. Ribot while agreeing with these decisions, called the attention of the English Ministers to the heavy responsibility devolving upon them in case the weakening of the Saloniki front should lead to a rearrangement of the enemy's excellent forces. Bonar Law answering Thomas, who supported Ribot's arguments, said the following. The root of our disagreement rests in the suspicion by our Ally France of England's intention gradually to remove her armies from Saloniki. I may assure and you certainly have no ground to doubt the sincerity of my words, that your suspicions are unfounded".

In view of the fact that the pressing necessity, for England, ever to increase the number of divisions operating in Asia Minor, is caused by our unsteadiness on this theatre of war, 1 having no instructions, deemed it impossible to take part in the discussions during which 1 should have exposed myself to the risk of hearing weighty objections. Thus without joining officially, 1 called Milner's attention to the assurances given by the Russian Government that part of our Armies on the Caucasian front will in the near future be ready to cooperate with the English forces. Whereupon Milner answered that it is very desirable that 1 should inform my Government as to the high value to England of such cooperation. "Unfortunately", added Milner, "our situation in Mesopotamia has been seriously compromised, but it is possible to rectify it. It is universally recognized that in the near future no offensive is feasible. As to the question of a defensive, there are

there for such purpose more forces than necessary. It would be a real crime to keep in idleness a big army in Saloniki when part of it, however small, is urgently needed on another front". To be continued.

(Sign.) Nabokov.

III.

Analysed 29, VII, 17.

Secret Telegram of the plenipotentiary in London; July 26 (Aug. 8) 1917 № 624.

Refer to my telegram № 621.

To-day's concluding plenary session of the conference was devoted to the discussion of the formula reported by me in the previous telegram, concerning the transference of men from the Saloniki front. The formula underwent some modifications. Both France and Italy are practically entitled, in cases of inevitable emergencies, to remove separate divisions from Saloniki to other theatres of war. Lloyd George made a speech pointing out that in the interests of a successful conduct of the war it is indispensable that the chief Allied Powers clearly and definitely determine upon a detailed program of action as well as upon the direction in which their common efforts must needs be exercised. If we are unable at once to overcome all our foes, we ought to agree beforehand against which of them our decisive blow must be directed, then the headquarters of all the Allies must adopt this common plan as their guide. Ribot supported Lloyd George. Sonnino while agreeing in principle asked, however, the Conference to express the readiness of the Allies to use their efforts to the effect that Italy be supplied with artillery and munitions to enable her to undertake on a large scale a spring campaign.

All the ministers who participated in the debates pointed out that both the internal position of Russia and the state of our army offer at present no criterion as to how far Russia will be able to cooperate in the near future. Such sentiment pervading the Conference 1 deemed it impossible to come forth with any explanations whatsoever. I have, however, reason to believe that I shall have more occasion now than heretofore to meet Lloyd George and inspire him with confidence in Russia's ability to overcome all obstacles and to restore her army. A session of a limited number of the Cabinet members headed by Ribot and Sonnino will take place with the participation therein of Robertson and Foche. Lloyd George told me that there will be discussed questions of strategy regarding the western front. To me, however, it is clear that the situation on the Russian front will be considerd there and that, therefore, the presence of a Russian representativie at the present moment would be an obstacle in the way of a completely frank exchange of views. I shall not fail to convince Balfour of the necessity to communicate to us the results of the Conference in full.

(Sign.) Nabokov.

Terestchenko defends the Kornilov-movement.

A secret telegram to the ambassadors in Paris, London, Rome, Washington, Tokyo and to the consul in Stockholm.

The move of general Korniloff is ended; it has all passed without bloodshed, since the army lead by him upon Petrograd refused to act against the Provisional Government to which it declared itself loyal.

Kornilov has agreed to surrender to Aleveiev who had gone to the Headquarters. The generals who had participated in the insurrection are on trial. It

now develops that in all this affair there played a very significant part a mutual misconception and a misunderstanding caused by various unsuccessful and suspicious intermediators between the Headquarters and the Government; special blame, however, falls upon the immediate sphere surrounding Kornilov.

At present calm and order reign supreme with the exception of some unrest among the Kossaks, stirred up by general Kaledin, but withont any possible consequences. The new power has been organized. Kerensky remains Premier and is appointed Commander-in-Chief, in order to quiet the democratic elements and the soldiers. In reality, Alexeief appointed Chief of Staff will lead the military operations. A series of appointments is being made in the army indicating the intention of the Government to bring it in order. Also the composition of the Government will fully answer the demands of the moment, which is guaranteed by the appointments of general Verkhovsky as minister of War and of admiral Verderevsky as minister of the Navy. As to the rest, there will be changes. Chernov is out for good; likewise some of the Kadets and Nekrassov. Enter Cadet Kishkin and some representatives of the merchant class. Jointly with the other ministers I have handed in my resignation; the question of my reentering the ministry has not been decided yet. The new Government faces the task of preventing all unrest, conflict and disorder in the army that may arise in consequence of mistrust to the composition of the staff. To this end most energetic measures are planned. At the same time, by declaring martial law in Petrograd and Moscow, all laws have been established there needful for the restoration of order in the rear. At present in connection with the Kornilov affair the Bolsheviki have gained extraordinary force and demand the release of those arrested the 5th. of July. However, the Government's position was considerably strengt-

hened by the victory and there is reason to expect a most energetic struggle with bolshevism. On the whole, there is ground to believe that the sad events of the last days, owing to their rapid solution, have not weakened us for the fight with the foreign foe, but have rather proved the growth of the sentiment of unity as well as the general tendency to concentrate our forces upon the fight, undistrurbed by the internal strifes and quarrels. Any future attempts, should they occur from left or right, to divert the political policy of the Government will, it may be hoped, meet with the necessary resistance in the country. As to the Government, it will unswervingly follow the course of continuing the war at any cost, carrying on with renewed energy the work of renovating and invigorating the army.

Sent the 31st. Aug. № 4059. Cip. Terestchenko.

"No more Russia"

Analysed Sept. 12. 232-434.

Secret Telegram to the Plenipontentiary in Bern. Sept. 9—22, 1917. № 713.

(Promt) From Serafimov: A few days after the meetings reported in the telegram sub. № 701 Archimandrite Stephen was again summoned to Topop. Pocov there introduced him to an English diplomat whose name he refused to disclose, stating only that he was in reality a plenipotentiary of the British Governement. The Englishman spoke to him as follows: "Before utilizing the forces of Japan and Greece which would call for considerable concessions to them by the Allies, the latter have decided once more to show their goodwill to Bulgaria. Indeed. all

her national desires could be satisfied by the Entente Powers who might not even insist upon the removal of Ferdinand". He further explained that the Bulgars may count upon the annexation of Dobruja and even hinted at the possibility of their receiving the line Midea-Rodosto. He also spoke of an independant Macedonia with Solun as capital.

Stephen answered that he would like to see here a Russian delegate, as the sympathies of Bulgaria to Russia have since the Revolution grown in intensity and her participation is thus indispensable, the more so, since the questions of the Dardanelles and of Dobruja directly concern her. Moreover, he expressed the idea that the reaching out for the Dardanelles and Solun once nearly brought Bulgaria to ruin, while a Bulgarian Dobruja presupposes a Rumanian Bessarabia which latter point is from the Russian point of view inadmissible. The following phrase then escaped from the Englishman's lips: "There is no more Russia", which he hastened to explain as meaning that we are at present busy with internal affairs and are therefore unable to pay attention to international politics. He also added that England is acting in the name of all the Allies. On taking leave he asked Stephen to communicate to him thru Pocov as soon as possible Bulgaria's maximum demands.

Contin. in № 719.

(Sign.) Onu.

A secret Telegram by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Plenipotentiary in Paris. Sept. 12/25, 1917. № 4239. 7/XI № 9.

Referring to your № 947.

From the viewpoint of the Russian interests, the Asia Minor agreement can not be regarded as standing alone by itself. Its fulfillment depends upon that

of the agreement concerning the Straits, This idea has unequivocally been expressed in the closing phrase of the first telegram giving our opinion as to Constantinople, Febr. 19, 1915, № 937 and has further been repeated in the memorandum regarding the Asia Minor agreement, transmitted to both the English and the French Ambassadors in Petrograd March 4, 1916, sub № 205. It is stated in this memorandum thus: It is beyond doubt that Russia's consent in respect of the foregoing points, is contingent upon the agreement between France and England concerning Constantinople and the Straits.

Inasmuch as our said declarations were unreservedly accepted by the French Gavernment, it follows that the Asia Minor agreement can not be considered apart from the agreement respecting Constantinople and the Straits, and conversely, any alterations whatever in the latter, one way or the other, must invariably find their corresponding reflections in the former.

Besides, if in unison with Ribot we were to consider the Asia Minor agreement as not completed then it is so much less binding.

You will please adhere unswervinglv to this viewpoint in the case of further exchange of views with the French Government.

Russian Defenders in the service of the Liberals.

Secret Telegram to the Ambassadors in Paris, London, Rome, Washington and Tokyo, and to the Consul in Stockholm. Sept. 26 th. (Oct. 9 th.) 1017 № 4438.

After prolonged negotiations with the representatives of the democratic council on the one hand, and with the cadets and merchants on the other, a coalition ministry was formed the composition of which has been communicated to you. As fundamentally characteristic of these negotiations must be noted the readiness with which the leaders of the democracy yielded, conscious as they are that the passage of power into the hands of the socialists would at present be to them highly disadventageous. However, the importance of these concessions is reduced by the fact that the relatively moderate socialistic leaders have considerably lost in their control over the masses, swept as these are by the extreme currents, and retain it not without difficulty.

In connection with this event, a split is noticed within the democratic ranks. The more moderate elements of all the parties begin to group themselves around the rural and city selfgovernments legally elected by universal voting. The participation in this movement of the cooperatives lends it a still greater significance, since behind it there stands the peasantry. On the other hand, the Bolshevik and anarchistic currents gradually take possession of the Soviets of workmen's and soldiers Deputies, which is already an accomplished fact in Petrograd and goes on in many other cities. Such Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies assume with reference to the Government an attitude of hatred and defiance, but lose in influence within the wide ranks of the population. Highly significant will be the rôle of the Preparliament which, until the coming together of the Constituent Assembly, has to serve as the people's representative body. Altho the socialists will have in the majority, yet in union with the representatives of the liberal parties the socialists will, doubtless, he able to withstand the Bolsheviki. It must not be forgotten that the country will listen to the voice of the moderate groups whose patriotic manifestations can not fail of effect. As to the program of the Government, it reduces itself to 3 main points: To raise the fighting capacity of the army, to maintain in the country elementary order, to fight economic ruin. Yesterday

was started a general railway strike. Against it measures are taken partly with a view toward satisfying the demands of the railway men, and partly of a repressive character. The strike is hardly capable of development as it meets with no sympathy. At the front it does not spread.

Stockholm, Oct. (Nov. 1), 1917.

(Very prompt)
Honorable Sir,
Serge Georgevich.

You undoubtedly remember the anonymous edition „J'accuse", that has made so marked a furor. No less grave an accusation against the Germans has been brought forward, but over his signed name, by the well known Swedish writer Dr. Nyström. Several copies of his book entitled „Vor dem Tribunale" were delivered by him to the German Socialists assembled at the preliminary gatherings of the never realised Conference. The Germans were higly satisfied with its contents and expressed the view that the spread of the edition in large numbers will invariably produce a powerful impression and exert a lasting influence upon their compatriots.

In view of this fact Dr. Nyström decided to publish the book at once in two editions: one dear and one cheap. He offered the allies 8000 copies at 50 Ere a piece for the purpose of spreading them among the captives or scattering them from aeroplanes over the camps of the enemy. The French Government has already availed itself of this offer and bought 8 thousand copies which have already been forwarded from Christiania where the book is printed, to France. The printing of such work would not have been allowed by the former cabinet.

My English colleague is zealously advocating before his Government the acceptance of this disinterested offer of the Swedish idealist. On my part, I too, consider it higly useful that we should not spare so relatively trifling a sum as 4000 cr. to propagate this work among the German captives in our camps. To bring home to them the conviction that the real culprits of the war are the Germans, may prove useful to us not only now, but, perforce in a still higher degree, after the war.

In view of all this I take the liberty to ask you not to refuse us your influential support. I am sending you herewith a copy of the foregoing book. The author has sent one to the Premier thru Dr. Alexandrov, but he could hardly have familiarized himself with its contents.

Accept, dear Sir, the assurance of my complete respect and devotion, Gulkevich.